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n january 2, 2006, the Sago Mine
disaster gripped the nation and
the world. The fate of thirteen
miners lost deep in a WestVirginia coal
mine hung in the balance as rescue
efforts dragged on for two days and
nights. 'The hopes and prayers of the
miners' families and countless millions
in a vast television audience seemed
finally to be answered as the words
"they're alive!" resounded through the
mine site and around the world. But
the joY of a miracle was cruelly doused
by the terrible newvvs that, in fact, there
was only one survivor clinging to life
and that twelve miners had perished.
Four years later, on April 5, 2010, a
massive explosion ripped through the
Upper Big Branch (UBB) Mine in a
small town in southernWest Virginia.
That explosion, -which instantly took the
lives of twenty-nine coal miners and seriously injured two others, was the worse
United States coal mining disaster in
forty years.
West Virginia coal miners and their
peers throughout Anierican and global
coalfields work in anonymiinty to provide
the power that fuels the American and
global economy and the electricity that
allows all of us to live in unparalleled
confort. In light of those human sacrifices, governnental policy should explore
and stimulate new ways of examining
and solving a very old probletn-providing the safest possible workplace for
America's coal inirers.
Tackling the complex issues associated with coal mining safety requires
the creative thinking involved in both
comparative law and interdisciplinary
analyses.

* Associate ProfessorWestVirginia University
College oft as this article updates a longer
version oniginally published at I1 1WV L. REV

Overview of Safety Issues
Coal mining is a dangerous occupation. Putting aside the long-term health
problems associated with mining, such
as black lung disease--which according to the United Mine Workers clainis
the lives of as inany as 1500 coal miners
a year-coal operators, regulators, and
miners face niany hazards, most notably
fires, floods, explosions, roof falls, electrocution, and powered haulage and
machinery accidents.
The coal mining industry's annual
fatality rate-2.3 per 10,000 workersis five times more hazardous than the
average private workplace. By analogy
this means that six or seven of the 29,000
WestVirginia University students would
die each year in university-related accidents, compared with a bit more than
one death at other similarly sized universities.
Miners put themselves in harm's way
every time they walk into a mine, so that
others can benefit from the comforts
of modern society. About ninety-two
percent of the coal produced in the
United States is used to generate electricity, and fifty percent of the electricity
generated in the United States is fueled
by coal. Other coal is used either for
international export or for making prod
ucts such as synthetic materials, paper,
steel, cement, and iedicine.

Case Studies: Sago and UBB
At the time of the Sago explosion,
which ripped through the mine project
ing outward from a sealed area into the
active workings of the mine, twenty-nine
miners were underground. Sixteen
miners, who were located a fair distance
from the ignition point and not seriously injured by the blast, escaped. The
thirteen miners near the blast were not
so fortunate. One miner was killed by
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the force of rie explosion itself; the other
twelve attempted to escape. Consistent
with their training, the twelve miners
tried to activate their breathing apparatus, a self contained self-rescuer, but
four of those SCSRs reportedly failed
or the niners otherwise were unable to
operate them. According to a prelininary report by Davitt McAteer, former
Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and
Health, to West'Virginia Governor Joe
Manchin, the inuers "had to abort that
escape attempt wxhen they encountered
thick dust and swirling smoke." Still
following approved safety training,
the miners "turned back and retreated
behind a curtain ... at the working face

of the section in an attempt to barricade themselves against the smoke and
carbon monoxide created by the explosion." There those twelve miners waited,
unaware that rescue efforts were moving
ruch more slowly than they might have
expected.
Lack of communication between
the rescuers and the twelve survivors
of the initial blast proved critical. For
exaiple, had technology been available
that allowed communication between
rescuers and iners, rescuers may have
pinpointed the rniners' location, allowing therm to drill a borehole that could
have provided a fresh air source and/or
an escape route. Proper communication
would have allowed rescuers to deter
mine that there was in fact no fire in the
mine, enabling rescue teaims to enter
the mine earlier. Rescuers could have
told the miners that there was breathable air in a nearby, still-accessible area.
Instead, twelve miners surrounded by
toxic methane laden airtwaited to be
rescued; eleven of them eventually died
of asphyxiation awaiting rescue.
The UBB disaster raises different questions. The official report is incomplete,
but journalists have reported that there
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'Were no sut vivors immIiediately folloving the nmassive explosion and that the
UBB mine had been previously cited for
several safety violations. This raises differ
ent questions about prevention. Who
is in the best position to prevent such
tragedies when no rescue is possible?
Workers? Operators? Government?
Are workers' representatives, operators
and government officials cooperating to
create safe workplaces? Are any operators circumventing safety rules, resulting
in preventable tragedies? Are injury rates
a better indication of safety than fatality
rates and, if so, are operators, especially
in nonunion nunies, accurately reporting
those injuries?
The Sago and UBB disasters remind
us that the continual, umioticed price we
pay for our comfort can include serious
injury and even death of those whose
labors unlock the energy of coal. As
Ken Ward Jr. reported in the Charleston
Gazette,"[ijine disasters like Sago get
headlines. But far more coal miners
die . . alone, crushed by heavy equip-

nient, ground up by runaway nachiniery,
buried beneath collapsed mine roofs."

Questions Raised in the
Aftermath
In light of the Sago and UBB disasters,
it seems relevant to ask: What, if any,
obligations do we owe workers who
endanger themselves for our benefit?
What role, if any, should the law play to
protect coal miner safety? Is coal inining
in the United States as safe as it can be?
According to the governmeint's official
mine safety statistics, the year 2006, with
forty-seven coal miner deaths (24 from
WestVirginia), was the deadliest year
for American coal miners since 1995.
But 2010 is not far behind. At the time
of this writing, 42 miners have already
perished-33 of those miners came from
WestVirginia, making 2010 already the
deadliest year for that state in at least
three decades.
Spikes in coal miner deaths have
occurred three times in the past 16
years. In addition to the 42 miners who
died in the first sevei months of this
year, 47 miners died in 1995 and 2006.
Otherwise, deaths have ranged between
18 arid 38 niners per year. Consider-
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ing the 2006 and 2010 death spikes,
arid the disproportionate toll that West
Virginian coal miners have borne, it
is natural to wonder whether other
najor coal-producing states, such as
Kentucky and Pennsylvania, and other
coal-producing countries, such as China,
India,Australia, South Africa, Russia, or
Britain are experiencing a rise in the
level of workplace fatalities. Are these
recent death-spikes statistical anomalies
or can they be attributed to soie cause,
such as lax enforcernent of safety regulations, inadequate safety equipment and/
or preventive measures, or some other
regulatory deficiency? Do the deathspikes simply reflect a rise in coal mining
production, such that the number of
absolute deaths does not actually reflect
a relatively more dangerous workplace?
Is there some other explanation such as
random variation.
This analysis is complicated by a
fundamental distinction between work
enviromnents. Mining in the Appalachian Coal Region-WestVirginia,
Kentucky, and Pennsylvania-is
conducted to a significant extent in
large underground mines, while coal
mining in the Great Plains and InterMountain West comes mainly from
mid- to large-sized surface mines.
These differences may affect fatality
rates because causes of accidents differ.
Explosions usually cause underground
mining accidents that trap miners,
increasing the death toll and encouraging sensationalization. By contrast,
surface mining accidents often involve
machinety or truck accidents, blasting
injuries, and falls. An accurate statistical
analysis of fatality rates must account for
these differences to (1) document with
precision the types of hazards associated
with each and (2) develop strategies for
addressing those hazards. A comparative law analysis of underground mining
hazards alone may reveal significant
differences. For example, most underground mining fatalities in India are
caused not by explosion but by inundation, a problem that underground mines
in the United States do not experience.
Even if the recent death-spikes are
statistical anomalies, the Sago aid UBB
disasters emphasize inherent dangers.

From a cost-benefit perspective, it is
inportant to imquire whether the industry and government regulators support
economically reasonable steps to keep
miners safe. From a worker tights
perspective, on the other hand, one must
bear in mind that twenty-two deaths per
year are twenty-two too iany deathsand it is essential to ask wshether those
institutions are doing all they should to
keep miners safe. That inquiry leads to a
host of other questions divided into three
categories: regulation, enforcement, aihd

technology.
With respect to regulation and
enforcement, we must identify the extent
of any relationship between imine safety
regulations and trends in iiine safety.
One muight ask whether and how downward trends in mining injury and fatality
rates correlate with Increased regulation
and, more importantly, increased enforcenient of safety regulations. Do upwiard
trends correlate with lax enforcement
of existing regulations, deregulation,
or even failure of the governmrent to
provide sufficient funding for inspection
and regulator enforcement? No matter
what answers ultimatels are identified,
it is important that the questions be
asked and possible answsers be objectively
analyzed.
The death-spikes also raise questions
regarding the sufficiency of the technology available to coal mners. For
exaniple, are the technologies that are
currently available, including post-Sago
innovations, sufficient to make under-ground mining safer? Is the best available
technology being used in mines or are
regulators and operators settling for
cheaper alternatives? Are there technolo
gies on the horizon that would nake
underground mining safer? If the technology is available, is there a distribution
problem? To what extent can post-disas
ter legislative initiatives and voluntary
coal industry efforts contribute to safer
coal mines?
Given the complexity of these
questions, both a comparative law and
an interdisciplinary approach are
appropriate.

cotinnued on next page
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The Comparative Law Approach

legal systems to determine how those
systers differ and compare with one
another for the purpose of better understanding our ow i legal system. Initially,
comparative law study allows us to ques
tion our own biases by revealing them.
What better wvay to see our implicit
assumptions about hows the law should
look than by studying different solutions
to the same legal issue set in different
jurisdictions' Such analysis allows us to
obtain a deeper and inore sophisticated
understanding of ouT OwnV
legal system
By opening our eyes to other ways
of regulating behavior, comparative law
allows us to find solutions to our own
legal problems that mnay elude us because
of our own biases. All academics become
entrenched in a certain way of thinking
typically inherited firon their academic
rraining. And so, when a Nevton, or
a Darwin, or an Einstein comes along,
we are amazed that someone trained
in a certain way of thinking is able to
throw offthose academic shackles and
think about a problems in a ne' was In
pursuing law as an academic subject,
comparative law study makes this process
easier by providing the perspective we
need to observe anoralies and then,
ideally, to appreciate the solution that
othenvise eludes us because of our inindset.
Comparative law study can also be
done at a domestic level. Indeed, one of
the strengths of oui owi legal system is its
federal constitutional nature. By allowing
states to experinmerit with different solutions to the same legal problems facing
several states, we all benefit from the collec
tive and different experiences of the parts.
The Sago disaster, in some sense,
has already revealed anomahes in coal
nning safety laws and regulations.
Notwithstanding some exanples to
the contrary, most notably, the modern
day sweatshop, wlich renains extant in
parts of the UiJuted States, ineimbers of
the legal community and citizens of this
country in general hold fast to the view
that our country has moved beyond
its industi-sal-res olutiton-era history of
workplace abuse. At least with respect
to coal mining, there is much truth

in that perspective. Our current track
record easily surpasses the horrors of
the pre-1930 period, when on average
2,295 miners were killed each year.
Yet, as journalist Ken WairdJr. reported,
"swhile 13WestVirginia coal miners
were trapped inside the Sago Mine . .,
three Tasmanian miners were saved from
a fire by an 8-by-5-foot steel box", and
less than a month after twvelve of the
thirteen Sago coal niners perished,"72
miners in Saskatchewan were rescued
after being trapped underground for 30
hours, thanks to a similar box called a
mine rescue chamber." On the other
hand, less than six months after the Sago
disaster, and eight days after the West
Virginia Office ofMiners' Health, Safety,
and Training imposed a statewide moratorium on the installation of supposedly
"explosion-proof" Omega block seals
used at Sago-five more men in Darby,
Kentucky perished in a coal-mine
explosion in which Oinega block seals
failed. Despite the eighty-year trend of
declining fatalities in United States' coal
mines, the Sago and Darby disasterstwo underground mine explosions, six
months apart, in which "explosionproof" seals failed-arid the more recent
JlB disaster, raise serious questions
as to the current safety of the mining
industry.
The comparative law approach allosvs
LIsto examine American coal ine safety
on several levels. First, we look in our
own backyard: hosw do various state coal
mine safety records in large underground
mined coal producing states (e.g.,West
Virginia, Kentucky and Pennsylvania)
stand tip to mine safety records in other
coal-producing states? We might then
assess the safety records of other countries
engaged in underground coal mining.
In both cases, we must ask whether the
underlyinig causes for fatalities differ. For
example, preliminary research suggests
that death by inuindation is increasing in
India, while underground flood fatalities
have never been a significant problem in
the United States. Does that mean that
the United States has something to teach
India about preventing underground
imne floods, or does it mean only that
certain geological circumstances imake
Indian mines miore susceptible to flooding than Aiericai mines?
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According to the Oxford University
ConparativeLaw Fonn, comparative law
is the academic exinaition of various

These questions must be answered by
government, industry, and labor. This
diversity of perspective will ensure a fair
discussion of the substantive questions
raised in the aftermath of Sago and UBB.

The Interdisciplinary Approach
Coal mining is a regulated industry
in the United States. Comprehensive
federal legislation of coal minie health
and safety first appeared in the aftermath
of the Farnington disaste; anotherWest
Virgiiia mine explosio leading to enact
ment of the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act in 1969. After another
mine disaster, Congress passed the more
stringent Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act of 1977 (Mine Act of 1977). Since
the passage of the Mine Act of 1977, there
had been a steady decrease in coal mining
fatality rates, at least until 2006. However,
the extent to which coinprehensive coal
mine safety regulations has affected this
downward trend should be evaluated. It
-would Also be usefil to compare safety
records in union aid nonunion minesafter all, the last four underground coal
inine disasters all occurred in nonunion
nines, taking the lives of 52 miners.
Perhaps differing presidential philosophies
about health and safety regulation has
affected coal mine safety enforcement
aid lax enforcement has resulted in more
fatalities. The regulatory context of coal
mine safety and a comparison of regulatory philosophies naturally lead its to two
fundamental questions: What role, if any,
should tie law play iri regulating coal
mining safety? Ifthe law has a role to play,
what remedies or sanctions, if any, should
the law mandate?
Whether the law should play a regulatory role in mine safety is not solely a
legal question. To evaluate that qtiestion properly it is necessary to bring to

bear the expert knowledge oflawyers,
econollnists, and policy miakers to evaluate the extent to which safety regulations
in fact make the workplace safer. Such
experts must also determine the extent
to which the free iiarket provides sufficient incentives to encourage nine safety.
Few adhere to the extreme view that
mine safety regulatioi should be entirely
repealed. But those who do advocate
that positioi believe that the flee market
will drive unsafe mines out of business.
IVolume 36, Ntnmber I

By contrast, those who favor regulation
point to market failures driven in part
by imperfect information or inequality of bargaining power between the
coal miners and their employers. More
fundamentally, those who favor nine

proponents of safer or whether they
merely represent the interests of former
clients. Others argue that decreasing
union density in coal mines contributes
to lax safety enforcement
Assuming there is a role for law-to

The iniiers'breathing equipment failed,
eliminating the possibility of escape and
leaving the miners to barricade themselves as a last resort. Finally, unlike the
mines in Tasmania and Saskatchewan, the
Mine Act of 1977 did not require, and

safety regulation believe that it is the

comIbat market failure, to fulfill a perceived

the Sago mine was not equipped with,

moral obligation of our legislature to
enact laws to protect workers.
Assuming a regulatory scheme is
appropriate, one might ask whether
current enforcement measures are
sufficient. Are fines adequate or should
criminal sanctions including inprisonment be imposed for willfil violation
of federal or state safety standards? In

hunian-rights goal of creating sore floor
of employee safety rights, or to achieve a
combination of those economic and social
goals-one rnust reevaluate what we need
to regulate and whether some current
regulatory approaches should be discarded
for new initiatives.
To answer these questions, it is necessary for Congress to hear froi the
various constituents, labor officials and
industry representatives, who, because
of their experience in working in and
operating mines, can identify some of
the things that we need to regulate. For
example, according to the Sago Report,
several technological failures likely led to
the Sago disaster. The Oiiega block seals
failed. C oinmmunications systems failed.

an emergency shelter that could have
allowed miners to sur ive underground
for an extended period of time. The
UBB Report will provide additional
suggestions, which are likely to focus oni
enforcement and prevention,

fact, the Mine Act of 1977 provides for

criminal sanctions but regulators do
not systematically impose such penal
ties. Perhaps less obviously, we must ask
whether Congress is properly finding
administrative agencies charged with
inspecting mines. Some have asked
whether those government officials
charged with miner safety are neutral
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Conclusion
Coal mining is aii important industry
for oir nation and the global economiiy.
Although coal mining is safer here than
it is in most other countriesAppalachian
miners seem to be at higher risk than
miners in other areas of the country.
Given this disproportionate burden
borne by some ofour poorest citizens,
it seems reasonable to engage in some
creative thinking to improve safety. C
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